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"SUDDEN AND ACCIDENTAL" POLLUTION
EXCLUSIONS:
THE BATTLE BETWEEN INSURANCE
CARRIERS AND INSUREDS CONTINUES
PENNY R. WARREN*
After years of contentious litigation in federal and state courts,
the war between insurance carriers and the purchasers of comprehensive
general liability (hereinafter "CGL') insurance policies' over whether
their CGL policies cover environmental damage continues in our judicial
system. Between the early 1970's and the mid-1980's, CGL policies
contained a standard pollution exclusion ostensibly aimed at limiting the
carrier's liability for damages done by the insured's polluting activities.
Also contained in the CGL policies of the day was a "sudden and
accidental" exception to the exclusion, under which the company would
still be liable for pollution damages if the contamination was "sudden
and accidental." Application of these clauses continues to produce a
judicial standoff between insurance companies, who assert there is no
coverage for gradual environmental pollution, and insureds who seek
coverage for unexpected and unintended environmental damage.
Although the insurance industry discarded the "sudden and accidental"
clause in 1985 in favor of an absolute pollution exclusion, the "sudden
and accidental" exclusion continues to be triggered for environmental
damage that might have occurred in the 1970's and 1980's.2
* Senior Attorney, Wyatt, Tarrant, & Combs, 250 West Main Street, Suite 1700,
Lexington, Kentucky, 40507-1746. The author gratefully acknowledges the substantial research and
writing assistance of Beth Henderson while a Summer Associate with the firm.
CGL policies are designed to protect policyholders, mostly businesses and
governments, against many forms of unexpected and unintended liability. These policies place a
duty on insurers to defend and indemnify policyholders against any such successful claims. See
Nancer Ballard & Peter M. Manus, Clearing Muddy Waters: Anatomy of the Comprehensive
General Liability Pollution Exclusion, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 610, 620-21 (1990).
' See Robert G. Russell, Insuring for Protection Against Strict Liability Imposed on
Owners of Contaminated Property 4 ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATE COUNSEL, No. 2 (May 1997)
(explaining that typical environmental coverage cases involve latent contamination and, therefore,
which insurance policy (or policies) provides coverage becomes an important inquiry). The author
notes on page 3 that courts generally recognize four "triggers of coverage":
1. Exoosure. Some courts recognize that exposure triggers
policies in effect at the time of each release of a contaminant.
See, e.g., Insurance Co. of North Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations,
Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), affd. on reh'g, 657 F.2d 814
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The Insurance Services Office (hereinafter "ISO")3 proffered
exclusion "f' to apply to the standard form CGL policy, limiting
coverage in light of the growing demands for environmental protection.4
The exclusion provides:
This insurance does not apply ...
(f) to bodily injury or property damage arising out of
discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors,
soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or
gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or
pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any
water course or body of water; but this exclusion does
not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape
is sudden and accidental.5
While ISO drafted the "sudden and accidental" exclusion to clarify what
pollution would be covered by standard insurance policies, the phrase
(6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981).
2. Manifestation. Some courts recognize that manifestation
triggers policies at the time the contamination is first discovered
(or, perhaps, should have been discovered). See, e.g.,
Eagle-Picher Indus. Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12
(Ist Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1028 (1983).
3. Iniury-in-Fact. Some courts recognize that exposure does not
always result in damage and that, very often, injury (in the
context of contamination) has occurred before manifestation.
They have adopted an "injury-in-fact" trigger. See American
Home Products Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F.Supp. 1485
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff d as modified, 748 F.2d 760 (2nd Cir.
1984).
4. Continuous Trigger. Triggers each policy in effect when
property was exposed or injured-in-fact or when the damage was
manifest. One of the best, and most comprehensive, discussions
of the continuous trigger is found in Montrose Chemical Corp.
v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 878 (Cal 1995)(en banc).
Essentially, the court held that bodily injury and property damage
that was continuous or was progressively deteriorating throughout
several policy periods was potentially covered by all of the
policies in effect during those periods.
3 ISO and its predecessors drafted and continue to draft standard insurance contract
provisions that are then sent to state insurance commissioners for approval. State insurance
commissioners adopted Exclusion "f" and included it in CGL policies during the 1970's and early
1980's. See Ballard & Manus, supra note l, at 625-27.
' See Thad R. Mulholland, Comment and Case Note, The Saga of the Pollution
Exclusion Clause: How a "Sudden" Change Occurred Gradually, 2 Mo. ENVrL. L. & POL'Y REv.
26,27 (1994)(citation omitted). "Insurers constantly endeavor to narrow the scope of liability. Their
primary weapon in environmental law has been the 'pollution exclusion clause."' id.
' ISO form GL 00 02, Ed. 01-73. -
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"sudden and accidental" has produced many conflicting legal
interpretations.6
This article focuses on some of the recent interpretations of the
"sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion and the influence of the
drafting history of that exclusion upon those interpretations. Part I
describes the drafting history of CGL policies and the abandonment of
the "sudden and accidental" clause in favor of an absolute pollution
exclusion in the mid-1980's. Part II examines several recent cases
interpreting the meaning of "sudden and accidental." Some courts
decided the exclusion is unambiguous or contains a temporal element,
while others decided the clause leads to conflicting interpretations and,
therefore, should be interpreted in favor of the insured. One court even
went so far as to say that, despite the temporal meaning connoted by
"sudden and accidental," the insurance industry should be estopped from
denying coverage based on representations made to state insurance
commissions and insureds when the exclusion was introduced.7
Part III analyzes how the Supreme Court of Kentucky might
interpret the "sudden and accidental" exclusion if it should have the
opportunity in an appropriate case. Part IV concludes that, although the
majority of state and federal courts preclude coverage under this
exclusion, recent state court trends demonstrate a willingness to extend
coverage for environmental claims.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF POLLUTION EXCLUSIONS
IN CGL POLICIES
Pollution related insurance coverage in CGL policies found its
genesis in the early 1960's with the beginning of the environmental
movement in the United States.8 Prior to 1966, the standard CGL policy
excluded coverage for environmental damage unless it was "caused by
accident." 9 Those policies failed to define the term "accident."'" Perhaps
the industry decided that courts would accept the definition of "accident"
developed by insurance law scholars, as referring to "a distinctive event
6 See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Republic Ins. Co., 929 P.2d 535, 541 n. 3-4 (Wyo. 1996)
(citing over three dozen cases reaching various conclusions on the meaning and application of the
"sudden and accidental" exclusion).
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831 (N.J. 1993).
See generally Robert M. Tyler, Jr. & Todd J. Wilcox, Pollution Exclusion Clauses:
Problems in Interpretation and Application Under the Comprehensive General Liability Policy, 17
IDAHOL. REV. 497 (1981).
9 E. Joshua Rosenkrantz, Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause Through the Looking
Glass, 74 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1241 (1986).
1o Id.
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that takes place by some unexpected happening at a date that can be
fixed with reasonable certainty."" Subsequently, major difficulties
surfaced concerning the classification of environmental damage as an
accident or non-accident.
12
By the mid-1960's, insurance consumers demanded broader
liability coverage for environmental damage. At the same time, most
courts interpreted the term "accident" expansively. 3 In 1966, the
insurance industry changed its standard coverage from "accident-based"
to "occurrence-based." "Occurrence" was defined as "an accident,
including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results
in bodily injury or property damage neither expected or intended from
the standpoint of the insured." 4
Insurance industry spokespersons heralded the new "occurrence-
based" coverage as a "boon to policyholders." 5 In fact, the Assistant
Secretary of Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Gilbert L. Bean, said
in a 1965 paper presented to the Mutual Insurance Technical
Conference:
It is in the waste disposal area that a manufacturer's
basic premises operation coverage is liberalized most
substantially . . . . Manufacturing risks producing
insecticides, plant foods, fertilizers, weed killers, paints,
chemicals, thermostats or other regulating devices, to
name a few, have severe gradual [property damage]
exposure. They need this protection and should
legitimately expect to be able to buy it, so we have
provided it. 6
In only a few years, "occurrence" proved too burdensome to
Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 8, at 499 (quoting II COUCH ON INSURANcE 2d, § 44.283
(1963)).
,2 Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 8, at 499.
13 Id.
" Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 8, at 499-500 (quoting the standard language from the
1973 Comprehensive General Liability Policy promulgated by ISO).
" Carl M. Salisbury, Pollution Liability Insurance Coverage, The Standard-Form
Pollution Exclusion, and the Insurance Industry: A Case Study in Collective Amnesia, 21 ENVTL.
L. 357, 364 (1991).
16 Id. at 365-66 (quoting Gilbert L. Bean, New Comprehensive General and Automobile
Program, The Effect on Manufacturing Risks, paper presented at Mutual Insurance Technical
Conference, Nov. 15-18, 1965) (emphasis added).
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companies trying to avoid coverage for environmental damage, 7 so ISO
went back to the drawing board in 1970. The result was the "sudden and
accidental" pollution exclusion that attempted to eliminate all coverage
for pollution unless it was "sudden and accidental."' 8 As ISO had done
previously with the definition of "accident," it again chose not to define
"sudden" or "accidental." Committee reports support the position that
the "sudden and accidental" exclusion was merely a clarification of the
"unexpected and unintended" language in the occurrence-based policy. 9
Courts were thus left with the chore of interpreting "sudden and
accidental" according to the basic principles of contract construction.2'
Based on some of the recognized definitions of "sudden" and
"accidental,"'" the ISO may have believed that the cards were in its favor
and insurance coverage would be denied for all environmental claims
unless the damage occurred unexpectedly or abruptly. The idea that
"sudden" included a temporal element, requiring the environmental
damage to have occurred quickly and without notice rather than
gradually, appeared to be supported by several definitions of the term.22
Therefore, insurance companies may have felt confident that they would
face liability for coverage only when the environmental damage occurred
quickly and unexpectedly. Moreover, the industry may have presumed
that limiting coverage for "unexpected and unintended" environmental
'" Sharon M. Murphy, Note. The "Sudden and Accidental" Exception To the Pollution
Exclusion Clause In Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policies: The Gordian Knot of
Environmental Liability, 45 VAND. L. REv. 161, 166 (Jan. 1992). According to the author, many
courts found coverage for intentional polluters under the "occurrence" language, despite the
insurance industry's intent to preclude all coverage for intentional polluters. Id. at 166, n. 3 l(citing
Steyer v. Westvaco Corp., 450 F.Supp. 384 (D. Md. 1978); Grand River Lime Co. v. Ohio Cas. Ins.
Co., 289 N.E.2d 360 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972)).
' See generally Ballard & Maius, supra note 1.
'9 Salisbury, supra note 15, at 371.
o Ballard & Manus, supra note 1, at 614. As a further illustration, it has been observed
that:
This analysis of the ["sudden and accidental"] pollution exclusion is
supported by longstanding rules applicable to the construction of insurance
contracts. The law is firmly settled that to be effective, an exclusion must be
conspicuous, plain and clear and must be construed strictly against the
insurer and liberally in favor of the insured. The law is also established that
an insurer relying on an exclusion has the burden to prove that the exclusion
is applicable ... and that any ambiguities in an insurance policy must be
resolved in favor of the insured. Another fundamental concept is that "the
words used by the insurer must be interpreted in accordance with the plain,
ordinary and commonly understood meaning of the language employed."
Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 9, at 513 (quoting Lansco, Inc. v. Department
of Environmental Protection, 350 A.2d 520, 523 (N.J. 1975)).
2' For an extensive list of different dictionary definitions of the terms "sudden" and
"accidental," see Ballard & Manus, supra note 1, at 614-17.
2' See id
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
damage would sufficiently confine its duty to indemnify while appeasing
the needs of an increasingly insurance-dependent society.23 If the
insurance industry had adequately anticipated the huge number of
environmental cleanup sites in the 1980's and the astronomical costs
associated with their remediation, it may have defined "sudden and
accidental" and left nothing for interpretation.
In 1980, Congress enacted a monumental hazardous waste
cleanup program placing crippling financial liability on businesses and
individuals across the United States. This legislation, the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act 24 ("CERCLA"), marked the beginning of the end for the "sudden and
accidental" pollution exclusion.
CERCLA, more commonly known as Superfund, imposes strict,
retroactive, joint and several liability" on all potentially responsible
parties ("PRPs") for cleanup of contaminated waste sites.26 CERCLA
liability thus leaves companies and individuals responsible for massive
environmental cleanup costs and scrambling for coverage under their
CGL policies.27 Because many companies and individuals face liability
for environmental damage that occurred gradually and often many years
ago, it is natural to look to CGL policies purchased at the time.2 8
' Exclusion f was drafted before the enactment of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA") and other environmental legislation
that has placed huge financial burdens on those parties found liable for damages and remediation
costs.
14 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988), amended by Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), Pub. L. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
" Under CERCLA, a company or individual may be held liable for cleanup of an entire
site, even though that PRP contributed to only a small part of the pollution. CERCLA has
necessitated pollution insurance coverage more than perhaps any other environmental program in
the United States. See Melody A. Hamel, Comment, The 1970 Pollution Exclusion In
Comprehensive General Liability Policies: Reasons For Interpretations In Favor Of Coverage In
1996 And Beyond, 34 DUQ. L. REv. 1083, 1085-86. See also Salisbury, supra, note 15, at 357.
'6 Murphy, supra note 17, at 173 n. 76, observed that:
The stated purposes of CERCLA are to empower the federal government and
the states to take legal action against parties responsible for unauthorized
releases of hazardous substances into the environment; to provide funds for
government cleanup efforts where quick action is necessary or the
responsible parties cannot be identified; to collect information about
hazardous waste sites, particularly abandoned or inactive sites; and to assist
cleanup efforts by requiring prompt notification by responsible parties of any
release or substantial threat of release of hazardous substances into the
environment (quoting 2 ROWLAND H. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY
INSURANCE § 10A.02[ l][c] (1990)).
7 See John G. Nevius & Steven J. Dolmanisth, Note and Comment, The Pollution-
Exclusion Conspiracy: A Newly Recognized Basis for Recovery, 13 PACE ENvTL. L. REv. 1103,
1104-05 (Spring 1996).
28 See generally Russell, supra note 2.
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Insurance companies faced with an onslaught of coverage claims began
denying claims which were not the result of "abrupt" and "unintended"
pollution.2 9
The passage of CERCLA, coupled with early judicial decisions
construing "sudden and accidental" as ambiguous,3" forced the insurance
industry to limit its duty to defend and indemnify environmental claims
even further. The "sudden and accidental" clause was displaced by the
absolute pollution exclusion in the mid-1980's. The absolute pollution
exclusion clause was designed to eliminate coverage for all
environmental claims, not just those which are "sudden and accidental."'"
Although the "sudden and accidental" clause was replaced by the
absolute exclusion in standard CGL policies, there are many current
environmental claims where coverage is triggered in policies issued
between the 1970's and the mid-1980's and the "sudden and accidental"
exclusion applies. Thus, the "sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion
continues to be a highly litigious issue in this country's jurisprudence.
The next section of this Article discusses the conflicting rationales used
by courts in interpreting the "sudden and accidental" clause.
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE "SUDDEN
AND ACCIDENTAL" EXCLUSION
Many federal courts and several state courts have denied
coverage for environmental claims after concluding the "sudden and
accidental" pollution exclusion is either unambiguous or contains a
temporal requirement. A growing number of state courts, however, have
sided with insureds and held that coverage is available. Several recent
cases decided by the federal circuits and state supreme courts provide an
overview of the current trends in interpreting the "sudden and accidental"
exclusion.
Courts have interpreted the "sudden and accidental" pollution
exclusion in three ways: [1] Unambiguous and/or containing a temporal
requirement; [2] ambiguous and/or not containing a temporal
29 See Ballard & Manus, supra note 1, at 612.
Russell, supra note 2, at 4 (explaining that between 1981 and 1986, 27 of 35 courts
interpreted the "sudden and accidental" clause in favor of insureds).
3 Id. While analysis of the absolute pollution exclusion is beyond the scope of this
article, it is important to note that most courts have upheld the clause as unambiguous and
enforceable. See, e.g., Kruger Commodities, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 923 F.Supp.
1474 (M.D.Ala. 1996). At least two courts, however, including the Kentucky Court of Appeals, have
ruled in favor of coverage. Calvert Ins. Co. v. S & L Realty Corp., 926 F.Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. RSJ, Inc., 926 S.W.2d 679 (Ky.App. 1996).
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requirement; or [3] despite the fact that "sudden" contains a temporal
element, the insurance industry is estopped from denying coverage.
A. Federal Circuit Courts And Several State Courts Have Held In
Favor Of Insurers By Concluding That The "Sudden And
Accidental" Pollution Exclusion Clause Is Unambiguous
And/Or Contains A Temporal Requirement.
The first line of cases strongly supports insurers by concluding
that "sudden and accidental" is unambiguous.32 Most of these decisions
place a temporal requirement on the term "sudden, 3 3 requiring abrupt
environmental damage rather than gradual, cumulative damage in order
to trigger the insurance company's duty to defend or indemnify the CGL
policyholder for environmental damage.34
Courts which decide that "sudden and accidental" is
unambiguous properly refuse to consider extrinsic evidence and, instead,
analyze the policy according to the plain, common, and popular meaning
of the terms.3" The Tenth Circuit quoted from a decision of the
Oklahoma Supreme Court criticizing contrary holdings: "Decisions
finding ambiguity have focused on technical distinctions rather than the
32 Most federal circuits have upheld the "sudden and accidental" exception as
unambiguous and/or requiring "abrupt or sudden" environmental damage. See, e.g., A. Johnson &
Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 933 F.2d 66, 72-73 (1st Cir. 1991) (Maine law); Ogden Corp. v.
Traveler's Indem. Co., 924 F.2d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 1991) (New York law); Northern Ins. Co. of N.Y.
v. Aardvark Assoc., Inc., 942 F.2d 189, 192-93 (3d Cir. 1991) (Pennsylvania law); Snyder General
Corp. v. Century Indem. Co., 113 F.3d 536, 539 (5th Cir. 1997) (Texas law); United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc., 856 F.2d 31, 34 (6th Cir. 1988) (Kentucky law); Cincinnati Ins.
Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor Serv., Inc., 40 F.3d 146, 152-53 (7th Cir. 1994) (Indiana law); Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 968 F.2d 707, 710 (8th Cir. 1992) (Missouri law);
Smith v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 22 F.3d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1993) (California and Arizona law);
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Morrison Grain Co., 999 F.2d 489, 493 (10th Cir. 1993)
(Kansas law); City of Delray Beach, Fla. v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 85 F.3d 1527, 1532-33 (1lth Cir.
1996) (Florida law).
" See cases cited supra note 32. Also, approximately one-half of the state supreme
courts confronting this issue have determined that "sudden" means "abrupt." See, e.g., Dimmitt
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Corp., 636 So.2d 700, 704 (Fla. 1993); Upjohn Co. v.
New Hampshire Ins. Co., 476 N.W.2d 392, 397-98 (Mich. 1991); Board of Regents of the Univ, of
Minn. v. Royal Ins. Co., 517 N.W.2d 888, 892 (Minn. 1994); Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc.
v. Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 374, 382-83 (N.C. 1986); Hybud Equipment Corp. v. Sphere Drake
Ins. Co., 597 N.E.2d 1096, 1102 (Ohio 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 987, 113 S.Ct. 1585, 123
L.Ed.2d 152 (1993); Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 905 P.2d 760,763 (Okla. 1995).
.4 See, e.g., Aeroquip Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. 26 F.3d 893, 894 (9th Cir. 1994)
(per curiam); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. v. Belleville Indus., 555 N.E.2d 568, 572 (Mass. 1990); Kerr-
McGee Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 905 P.2d 760, 763-64 (Okla. 1995); Sharon Steel v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127, 135 (Utah 1997).
" See, e.g., Macklanburg-Duncan Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 71 F.3d 1526,
1536 (10th Cir. 1995).
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finding ambiguity have focused on technical distinctions rather than the
ordinary understanding of the word. 36 Since most pollution and damage
occurs gradually over time, construing the term "sudden" to contain a
temporal element significantly limits coverage.
1. Tenth Circuit: Quaker State Minit-Lube, Inc. v.
Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. 37
The Tenth Circuit examined state and federal court decisions
analyzing the meaning of "sudden and accidental" under Utah law 38 and
ultimately concluded that the phrase is unambiguous and means "abrupt
or quick and unexpected."39 The court refused to consider "sudden" as
including "'gradual,' 'routine' or 'continuous.""'4  In reaching this
conclusion, the court reasoned that construing "sudden" as devoid of a
temporal element would render the term "accidental" redundant.4' The
Idaho Supreme Court recently agreed with the Tenth Circuit and held
that, under Idaho law, the "sudden and accidental" exclusion
unambiguously requires that pollution occur abruptly.42
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Quaker State Minit-Lube points
out one problem facing courts that construe "sudden" as meaning
"abrupt" -- should the court employ a "spill-by-spill" analysis or an
overall damage analysis to pollution that has occurred gradually over
many years? That court, like most others considering this issue, refused
to hold that the gradual damage was caused by a series of individual
pollution occurrences, each of which happened abruptly.43
2. Third Circuit: General Ceramics, Inc. v. Firemen's
Fund Insurance Co.44
This case presented an interesting choice-of-law dilemma for the
Third Circuit in light of Pennsylvania's and New Jersey's differing
interpretations of the "sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion. The
Id. (quoting Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 905 P.2d 760 (Okla. 1995)).
3 Quaker State Minit-Lube, Inc. v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 52 F.3d 1522 (10th Cir.
1995).
Id. at 1527.
'9 Id. at 1528.
Io d. at 1527-28 (citations omitted).
I' d. (citations omitted).
42 North Pac. Ins. Co. v. Mai, 939 P.2d 570,572-73 (Idaho 1997).
13 Quaker State Minit-Lube, Inc. v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 52 F.3d 1522, 1530 (10"'
Cir. 1995).
. General Ceramics, Inc. v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 647 (3rd Cir. 1995).
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and accidental" exclusion in its CGL policy.45  The plaintiffs
manufacturing process occurred in New Jersey, but the waste was hauled
to a site in McAdoo, Pennsylvania, by a private hauler.46 The insurance
company argued Pennsylvania law applied and precluded coverage for
"gradual" pollution. The district court agreed and granted summary
judgment for the insurance company.
The Third Circuit concluded that Pennsylvania law precluded
coverage here unless "the discharge is abrupt and unexpected."47  New
Jersey law, on the other hand, would provide much broader coverage
under the Morton doctrine.48 The court disagreed that New Jersey would
follow a "bright line" rule regarding the site of the pollution as largely
controlling the choice of law issue and, instead, concluded that New
Jersey had the most dominant, significant relationship to the transaction
and the parties under Section 6 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICTS.49 Accordingly, the Third Circuit reversed the lower court's
summary judgment in favor of the insurance company."




The Minnesota Supreme Court decided the "sudden and
accidental" pollution exclusion unambiguously precludes coverage for
pollution which is "not both sudden, meaning abrupt, and accidental,
meaning unexpected and unintended. "52 The court reiterated its previous
interpretation of the clause and concluded that any reliance on other
explanations of the terms "sudden" and "accidental" were unreasonable."
This case is significant because of the court's unwillingness to
apply an equitable estoppel theory to the pollution exclusion. 4
Concluding that equitable estoppel requires reasonable reliance by the
" The EPA requested that the plaintiff remove from a site in McAdoo, Penn.,
approximately 115 toxic waste drums that had been deposited there by private waste haulers from
plaintiffs Haskell, N.J. manufacturing facility. Id. at 650.
4 Id.
41 Id. at 652.
' Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831 (N.J. 1993). For
a discussion of this case, see infra note 94 and accompanying text.
4 General Ceramics, 66 F.3d at 655.
I d. at 659. The case was remanded to the district court for a determination of whether
the discharge was unintentional and whether the damage was unexpected and unintended.
s' Anderson v. Minnesota Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 534 N.W.2d 706 (Minn. 1995).
52 Id. at 709 (citing Board of Regents v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 517 N.W.2d 888, 892
(Minn. 1994)).
" Anderson, 534 N.W.2d at 709.
54 Id.
[VOL. 12:243
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Concluding that equitable estoppel requires reasonable reliance by the
insured and that the terms "sudden and accidental" were unambiguous
in the policy, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected "equitable estoppel"
as a theory, under which an insured may obtain coverage."
4. Maryland: American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Artra
Group, Inc. 6
Maryland's highest court embraced lower court and federal court
decisions in concluding that the "sudden and accidental" exclusion
disallows coverage for gradual pollution, because "sudden" necessarily
contains a temporal element." This case arose out of Sherwin-Williams'
purchase of a paint manufacturing site from Artra.5 8 After the Maryland
Department of Environment required Sherwin-Williams to investigate
and remediate hazardous waste contamination in the soil and
groundwater at the site, the company sued Artra and other previous
owners to recover investigation and remediation costs. 9 Artra demanded
that its CGL insurer provide a defense and indemnify it against any
liability; but the carrier refused and brought a declaratory judgment
action for a determination that it had no such duties. 6W Maryland's
highest court ultimately ruled in favor of the insurance company. The
court cited numerous state and federal court decisions holding that
"sudden" means "abrupt;" therefore, coverage for pollution activity
occurring on a regular basis for an extended period of time was
precluded by the "sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion
t.6
Accordingly, there was no duty to defend or indemnify.62
Despite the reluctance of these and other courts to find coverage
under the "sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion, a number of state
courts have determined that coverage may be available for insureds.
SId. at 709-10.
American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Artra Group, Inc., 659 A.2d 1295 (Md. 1995).
I d. at 1308.
I' d. at 1296.
5' Id. at 1297.
60 Id
61 Id. at 1310 ("We agree with the numerous cases holding that allegations of
longstanding business activities resulting in pollution do not constitute allegations of 'sudden and
accidental' pollution.").
62 Id. at 1311.
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B. A Growing Number Of State Courts Have Decided Cases In
Favor Of Insureds By Construing "Sudden And Accidental" As
Ambiguous And Non-Temporal.
Decisions by the supreme courts of eleven states favor insureds
in their interpretations of the "sudden and accidental" pollution
exclusion, including Alabama,63 Colorado,' Georgia,65 Illinois,6
Indiana,67 New Jersey,68 Oregon, 69 South Carolina," Washington,7 West
Virginia,72 and Wisconsin." These decisions indicate a slight swing
away from the early plethora of decisions denying coverage. Three
recent state supreme court decisions are particularly illustrative of this
judicial willingness to provide coverage for environmental claims under
the sudden and accidental exclusion.
1. Alabama: Alabama Plating Co. v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
7 4
In December 1996, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed its
earlier decision in the same case and held that the term "sudden," as used
in the "sudden and accidental pollution exclusion," is ambiguous.75 The
case involved a metal finishing business seeking coverage under several
CGL policies for wastewater contamination created by its electroplating
process.76
The insurance company argued the policy provided coverage
only for pollution contamination "caused by an abrupt, short-lived
event." 77 The lower court agreed and granted summary judgment in
63 Alabama Plating Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 690 So.2d 331 (Ala.
1996).
, Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire. Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1991).
61 Claussen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 380 S.E.2d 686 (Ga. 1989).
6' Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204 (I1. 1992).
67 American States Ins. Co. v. Kiger, 662 N.E.2d 945 (Ind. 1996).
66 Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831 (N.J. 1993).
69 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. McCormick & Baxter Creosoting Co., 923 P.2d
1200 (Or. 1996).
0 Greenville County v. South Carolina Ins. Reserve Fund, 443 S.E.2d 552 (S.C. 1994).
7' Queen City Farms, Inc. v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 882 P.2d 703 (Wash.
1994).
7 Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 421 S.E.2d 493 (W. Va. 1992).
71 Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570 (Wis. 1990).
74 Alabama Plating Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 690 So. 2d 331 (Ala.
1996).
75 Id. at 335.
76 Id. at 332-33.
77 Id. at 334.
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favor of the insurer.78 The supreme court chose to follow the "narrow
majority of state supreme courts" which had held that the "sudden and
accidental" exclusion is ambiguous and must be construed in favor of the
policyholder to provide coverage for pollution which was "unexpected
and unintended."79  In coming to the conclusion that "sudden" is
ambiguous, the court pointed out that several dictionaries defined the
term as meaning "unexpected."8 Moreover, the court decided that, when
the exclusion was drafted, the insurance industry expressed its
unequivocal intent that the exclusion be considered merely a clarification
of the "occurrence" definition, which provided coverage for gradual
pollution and only disallowed coverage for intentional pollution.8'
Resolving these ambiguities in favor of the policyholder, the court held
that Alabama Plating presented substantial evidence that its insurance
company had a duty to provide coverage. 2
2. Oregon: St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v.
McCormick & Baxter Creosoting Co.
8 3
In a unanimous decision, the Oregon Supreme Court also found
coverage for environmental liability under the "sudden and accidental"
pollution exclusion.' McCormick involved a wood treatment plant
charged with liability for the leaching of several hazardous chemicals
from wastewater surface impoundments into the surrounding soil and
groundwater.85 These impoundments were used in one location from
1967 to 1971 and in another location from 1942 to 1978, and use of such
impoundments was a standard practice in the industry at the time.86 The
plant sought coverage under several different CGL policies, including
some with a "sudden and accidental" exclusion.87 The insurance
7 Id. at 339.
9 Id. 334-35.
80 Id at 335. After examining dictionaries published around 1970, the court decided that
"sudden" was ambiguous, because the term could be defined in at least two different ways, with
"unexpected" being the primary definition. The court determined that this ambiguity created the
need to examine the intent of the drafters of the exclusion. Id.
" Id. at 335-36. The court concluded that the drafters expressed their intent that
inclusion of the "sudden and accidental" exception in policies would result in "no reduction in
coverage." This intent was expressed through statements made by industry representatives and form
letters sent to state insurance departments. Id.
2 Id. at 338.
8 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. McCormick & Baxter Creosoting Co., 923 P.2d
1200 (Or. 1996).
8' Id. at 1218.
" Id. at 1204.
86 id.
97 id.
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company argued that a temporal meaning should be assigned to the term
"sudden," requiring some sort of "abrupt" environmental damage."s
However, the insured convinced the court that "sudden and accidental"
is ambiguous for four distinct reasons.
First, the court concluded several definitions of "sudden"
indicate the term may or may not include temporal restraints. 9 The court
also noted that, when used in reference to events, "accidental may stress
lack of intent."9 Second, use of the terms "sudden and accidental" by
the insurance industry in business interruption and boiler and machinery
insurance policies, prior to its use in the pollution exclusion, had been
interpreted by courts to mean "unexpected and unintended."'" Third, a
policyholder could reasonably interpret the exclusion as applying only
to "expected and intended" pollution.92 And fourth, growing judicial
recognition of coverage, despite the "sudden and accidental" pollution
exclusion, supported the policyholder's interpretation as reasonable.93
These two decisions exemplify the prevailing rationale used by
courts to conclude that the "sudden and accidental" exclusion should not
abrogate coverage for environmental claims. The New Jersey Supreme
Court went further by estopping the insurance industry from denying
coverage based on representations it made to insureds and state insurance
commissions in the early 1970's.
C. Morton International, Inc. v. General Accident Insurance Co. --
A Watershed Case In Favor Of Insureds. 94
In 1993, the New Jersey Supreme Court opened a new door for
coverage claims under the "sudden and accidental" exclusion. 95 The
court reversed seventeen years of New Jersey jurisprudence and held that
the phrase "sudden and accidental" contains a temporal element.96
However, the court concluded that the insurance industry should be
's Id. at 1216. The insurance company also argued that an "accidental event cannot be
something that is 'allowed to occur as part of [M & Bl's regular business practices for more than four
decades."' Id.
'9 Id. at 1217.
' Id. (citation omitted).
9' Id. See also Salisbury, supra note 15, at 379-82 (arguing that previous interpretations
of "sudden and accidental" in standard boiler and machinery industry contracts supported an
interpretation equating "sudden and accidental" with "unexpected and unintended").
92 McCormick, 923 P.2d at 1217-18.
9' Id. at 1218.
9 Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831 (N.J. 1993).
9s See Robert D. Chesler, New Door Wide Open for Pursuing Coverage Claims, ENVTL
COMP. & LIT. STRATEGY 3 (July 1994).
96 Morton, 629 A.2d at 847.
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foreclosed from denying coverage under this exclusion, based on
representations it made in the early 1970's about the meaning and extent
of coverage under the exclusion.97
Morton, a successor in interest to Ventron, faced liability for
remediation costs associated with mercury pollution in a creek adjacent
to a mercury processing plant operated for more than forty years.98 After
insurance carriers denied coverage and required Morton to provide its
own defense, Morton sought reimbursement for its defense costs and
indemnity for the cleanup and remediation expenses.99 The trial court
granted summary judgment for the other insurance providers, but held
General Accident liable for a portion of Morton's costs in defending the
action. The intermediate appellate court reversed and the New Jersey
Supreme Court granted review."
Analysis of the standard "sudden and accidental" pollution
exclusion clause in several of the triggered insurance policies consumed
a great deal of the court's opinion. The court overruled previous case law
holding that the clause merely imposed the same conditions on coverage
as were imposed by "occurrence-based" policies:
[W]e are persuaded that "sudden" possesses a temporal
element, generally connoting an event that begins
abruptly or without prior notice or warning, but the
duration of the event -- whether it lasts an instant, a
week, or a month -- is not necessarily relevant to
whether the inception of the event is sudden. The
meaning of the term "accidental" being generally
understood, we discern that the phrase "sudden and
accidental" in the standard pollution-exclusion clause
describes only those discharges, dispersals, releases,
and escapes of pollutants that occur abruptly or
unexpectedly and are unintended.'
Despite the decision to characterize "sudden" as "abrupt," the court
refused to enforce the pollution exclusion as written. Instead of
extending the "occurrence" definition of liability for "unexpected and
unintended" pollution, the court held the clause improperly restricted
" See generally, id. at 848-55.
9' Id. at 834.
" Id. at 835.
100 Id.
o Jd. at 847.
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pollution coverage. 102
The court decided that construing the exclusion in favor of the
insurer would contravene an important New Jersey public policy
requiring regulatory approval of standard industry-wide policy forms and
would condone the insurance industry's misrepresentations pertaining to
the scope of coverage under the "sudden and accidental" exclusion.'0 3
The Insurance Rating Board had repeatedly asserted that the exclusion
should be applied only to intentional polluters and not passive
polluters.'0 4 Moreover, if the exclusion was to be strictly applied,
insurance premiums should have been reduced accordingly.'0 5
Interestingly, the court noted that other jurisdictions interpreted the
pollution exclusion differently, depending on the level of the insured's
culpability -- the more that evidence indicates intentional pollution by the
insured, the less likely a court would find coverage, and vice versa.
Although most courts have refused to follow the Morton
regulatory estoppel doctrine, the decision has definitely exposed
insurance companies to other potential unfavorable decisions. Other
jurisdictions, which may even have ruled that sudden means abrupt, now
have an additional avenue for extending coverage for pollution.
III. How MIGHT KENTUCKY COURTS CONSTRUE THE "SUDDEN AND
ACCIDENTAL" EXCLUSION?
The conflict demonstrated by the decisions construing the
"sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion leaves many Kentucky
corporations and individuals, especially those faced with CERCLA
cleanup costs, asking the "million dollar question" -- how might
Kentucky courts decide this issue? Naturally, insurance companies
would rely on several Sixth Circuit opinions construing Kentucky law as
barring CGL coverage under policies containing the "sudden and
accidental" exclusion unless the pollution is "abrupt."'0 7 However, it
must be remembered that Kentucky state courts are not bound by Sixth
10 id.
'03 See generally, id. at 847-55.
o4 Id. at 869.
'0 Id. at 851.
'06 id. at 870-71.
107 See, Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Duro Bag Mfg. Co., 50 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 1995)
(refusing to certify interpretation of the "sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion to the Kentucky
Supreme Court); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. George W. Whitesides Co., 932 F.2d 1169
(6th Cir. 1991); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc., 856 F.2d 31 (6th Cir.
1988).
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Circuit decisions regarding Kentucky law."0 8 Moreover, several
published state court opinions suggest that Kentucky courts may
disagree with the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of Kentucky law regarding
the "sudden and accidental" exclusion.
A. State Court Decisions Provide Guidance in Analyzing how
Kentucky Might Interpret the "Sudden And Accidental"
Exclusion.
1. James Graham Brown Found., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Insurance Co. 109
In Brown, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the lower
court's determination that there was no "occurrence" within the meaning
of the policies and held that whether contamination was intended or
expected (and, thus, whether the insured had coverage under its
"occurrence-based" CGL policy), was a question of fact for jury
determination." Although most of the policies at issue did not contain
the "sudden and accidental" exclusion,"' the broad duty to defend
imposed on insurance companies may suggest how the Kentucky
Supreme Court would interpret the "sudden and accidental" exclusion." 2
Brown involved a wood preserving treatment plant where the
EPA had imposed CERCLA liability for wastewater discharge, chemical
spills, and rainwater runoff. t t3 After its CGL carriers denied coverage,
Brown sought a declaratory judgment in state court regarding the duties
to defend and indemnify. The circuit court held there was no coverage
under the "occurrence" language in the policy because wood processing
plants "were aware of the damage that was being incurred by the routine
operations."' '" The court of appeals affirmed." 5
'08 In a case involving duty to defend and indemnify a policyholder charged with
CERCLA cleanup costs, the Campbell Circuit Court refused to grant Home Indemnity Company's
motion for summary judgment and, instead, decided that genuine issues of material fact existed as
to whether the duty existed. David J. Joseph Co. v. Home Indem. Co., No. 92-CI-0018l, (Campbell
Circuit Court, Mar. 19, 1993). Although this decision is not binding, it provides some insight as to
how Kentucky courts might construe pollution exclusion clauses.
"0' James Graham Brown Found., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 814 S.W.2d
273 (Ky. 1991).
"' Id. at 281.
.Id. at 277. These policies were apparently issued before 1970.
"2 It should also be noted that two members of the five-justice majority and the two
dissenting justices are no longer sitting on the Supreme Court.
"3 Brown, 814 S.W.2d at 275.
"I Id. at 276.
11 Id.
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky held the record failed to show
that plant managers and executives "intended or expected" any
environmental damage from the plant's operations.' 16 Importantly, the
court declared that the essence of CGL policies implies broad coverage.
Accordingly, "[a]ll risks not expressly excluded are covered, including
those not contemplated by either party."' 7
Subsequently, the Sixth Circuit in Transamerica Insurance Co.
v. Duro Bag Manufacturing. Co."8 attempted to disregard the import of
Brown by stating that Brown merely "reiterated the interpretation
principles relied on by this Court in Star Fire Coals.""9  Brown,
however, suggests a willingness to grant broader coverage for
environmental claims than the Sixth Circuit will acknowledge. Evidence
includes the supreme court's interpretation of "occurrence" as creating
broad coverage under CGL policies and the holding that Brown should
be covered by its insurance unless there was a "specific and subjective"
intent to cause the pollution damage. 2' As the court said:
[W]e agree that if injury was not actually and subjectively
intended or expected by the insured, coverage is provided
even though the action giving rise to the injury itself was
intentional and the injury foreseeable.' 2'
2. Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. v. RSJ, Inc. 
1 22
In 1996, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky decided that the
standard "absolute" pollution exclusion in a CGL policy was ambiguous
and refused to deny coverage based on the exclusion. 23  This case
involved a dry cleaning business sued by its neighboring businesses.
24
RSJ sought coverage under its CGL policy, but was denied."2 The lower
court granted the insured's motion for summary judgment and
determined that the absolute pollution exclusion clause was ambiguous
116 Id. at 277.
"i Id. at 278.
"l Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Duro Bag Mfg. Co., 50 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 1995).
"9 d. (citing United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc., 856 F.2d 31 (6th
Cir. 1995)).
)20 James Graham Brown Found., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.- 814 S.W.2d
273, 278 (Ky. 1991).
121 1d
22 Motorists Mutual Ins. Co. v. RSJ, Inc., 926 S.W.2d 679 (Ky. App. 1996).
123 id.
114 All Alterations, the business located adjacent to RSJ, Inc., brought action against the
dry cleaning business for bodily injury sustained from a carbon monoxide leak. Id.
.. RSJ. 926 S.W.2d at 680.
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under Kentucky's principles of contract construction. 126
The court advanced three reasons for its conclusion that the
exclusion was ambiguous. First, conflicting legal interpretations of the
exclusion were a "factor to be evaluated in passing on the ambiguity in
the exclusion."' 27 Second, relying on a portion of the Morton decision,
the court declared that the insurance industry's representations about the
meaning of the exclusion, along with lay understanding of environmental
law terminology, led to the conclusion that a business could reasonably
interpret the policy as not barring coverage for this type of environmental
damage. 28 Third, literal interpretation of the exclusion would lead to
"absurd consequences." 29
Although the Supreme Court of Kentucky was not asked to
review the decision, the court of appeals' opinion offers encouragement
to insureds seeking coverage in Kentucky under the "sudden and
accidental" pollution exclusion or the "absolute" exclusion. So far, only
two other courts have found the absolute exclusion ambiguous. Because
eleven courts have determined that the "sudden and accidental" clause
resounds in ambiguity, the foregoing Kentucky cases provide a solid
basis for an argument that the Kentucky Supreme Court would disagree
with the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of the "sudden and accidental
pollution exclusion" under Kentucky law.
3. Howard v. Motorists Mutual Insurance Co.
30
Kentucky's Supreme Court also recently applied the estoppel
doctrine to an insurance carrier. After concluding that the insurance
company misled the insureds in handling claims related to a 1991
automobile accident, the court estopped the insurer from denying
coverage after it cashed the insured's check and retained the funds.
According to the court, estoppel requires a party to prove the
following:
(1) Conduct, including acts, language and silence,
126 Id.
27 Id. at 681. This is the same factor relied upon by several courts when concluding that
the sudden and accidental exclusion was ambiguous.
"2S Id. at 681-82. The Court appears at this point to have attributed to the absolute
pollution exclusion some of the Morton analysis regarding the sudden and accidental pollution
exclusion.
2.9 td. at 682.
' 44 K.L. Summary 7, 17 (June 27, 1997) (petition for rehearing is pending at the time
of this writing).
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amounting to a representation or concealment of
material facts; (2) the estopped party is aware of these
facts; (3) these facts are unknown to the other party; (4)
the estopped party must act with the intention or
expectation his conduct will be acted upon; and (5) the
other party in fact relied upon this conduct to his
detriment. 3'
The Morton decision highlights several misrepresentations made by the
insurance industry which appear to satisfy at least some, if not all, of
Kentucky's elements for estoppel. 3 '
B. Kentucky Case Law Appears to Support Insureds
Although Sixth Circuit opinions hold otherwise, Kentucky state
court opinions so far support insureds regarding coverage for pollution.
RSJ provides the most persuasive argument that Kentucky courts would
find the "sudden and accidental" clause ambiguous because the court of
appeals held that the absolute pollution exclusion clause is ambiguous.
Moreover, Brown, a Kentucky Supreme Court decision, indicates the
court would afford generous coverage under all aspects of the CGL
policy, not only those based on the "occurrence" definition. There is
even a possibility that courts would apply the Howard estoppel theory
and conclude, like Morton, that the industry is estopped from denying
coverage based on representations made in the early 1970's regarding
coverage under the "sudden and accidental" exclusion.
The Sixth Circuit decisions interpreting Kentucky law may be
of little comfort to insurance carriers. They are not binding on the state
courts and have been proven wrong in the past. Just recently, the
Michigan Supreme Court ruled on this question and rejected prior Sixth
Circuit interpretations of Michigan law that had denied coverage.'33
Only time will tell if the Supreme Court of Kentucky will do likewise.
131 Id.
132 Examples include the insurance industry's repeated assurances that the exclusion
applied only to intentional polluters and their knowledge that companies were relying on these
misrepresentations. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831, 849-55
(N.J. 1993).
133 American Bumper & Mfg. Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co,, 550 N.W.2d 475 (Mich.
1996) (holding that insurers had a duty to defend a CGL policyholder during a CERCLA
investigation; the insurance policies contained the "sudden and accidental" clause). Prior decisions
by the Sixth Circuit to the contrary include: FL Aerospace v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 897 F.2d 214
(6th Cir. 1990) and International Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Anderson Dev. Co., 901 F.2d 1368 (6th
Cir. 1990).
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IV. CONCLUSION -- THE BATTLE CONTINUES
As this article demonstrates, state and federal courts will likely
continue to disagree over the scope of coverage available to insureds
under the "sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion. Decisions will
continue to conflict regarding whether the clause is unambiguous and
temporal or ambiguous and non-temporal. It is also possible that courts
having decided that the terms have a temporal meaning may still adopt
the Morton analysis and preclude a denial of coverage.
These continuing battles highlight one consideration. If courts
cannot agree on the interpretation of the "sudden and accidental"
pollution exclusion, how could insureds be reasonably expected to
understand the scope of coverage? As one court recently observed, the
existence of so many conflicting interpretations of the scope of coverage
under CGL policies is strong evidence of ambiguity.1 34 The Kentucky
Court of Appeals followed this reasoning in RSJ.
One point remains clear -- coverage may still be available to
CGL policyholders under the "sudden and accidental" pollution
exclusion. This battle will eventually cease as policies containing the
"sudden and accidental" exclusion become distant history. At present,
the end is nowhere in sight.
"3 Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 667 A.2d 617, 624 (Md. 1995).
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